PCTC Paper on Terrorism



Police Superintendent Felipe L Rojas

Deputy Director for Research

I.                  Introduction

Terrorism has been recognized as the intentional use of violence or the means to inflict damage or harm innocent civilians and non-combatants (i.e.  unarmed military personnel or those who are not on-duty). At present, there is still no international consensus or universally accepted definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism.  One useful working definition is in the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995 in the Philippine Senate which is the “use of violence, threat or intimidation or destruction of lives and properties with the objective of creating a state of fear in the public mind to achieve a purported political end, to coerce or to influence their behavior, to undermine the confidence of the general public on the government.”[1]


            It has been established that terrorism is also linked to drug trafficking, money laundering and other transnational organized crime.[2]  One could not exist without the other.  Figure 1 below shows the inter-linking chain of different transnational organized crimes.  The question is “Where do we begin?”























Fig 1.  Links of Transnational crimes.[3]

            Terrorism in Southeast Asia registered a huge rise marked by the movement of huge quantities of explosives by land and sea, as militants used it in macabre suicide attacks on leading personalities or in mass attacks against strategic or commercial targets.[4] Shown below are the number of casualties in Southeast Asia per year:











II.               Philippine Experience on Terrorism

A.      Activities of International Terrorist Groups

Since 1986, three (3) violent incidents in the country were attributed to international terrorist groups.  First was the kidnapping-for-ransom of Mitsui Executive Noboyuki Wakaoji on November 15, 1986 at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. It was suspectedly perpetrated by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA).  Investigation revealed that the incident was a special joint operation called “Operation Customer” with Japanese businessmen as targets of kidnap-for-ransom.  The planning, coordination and supervision of the operation was directed by three (3) top-ranking cadres of the NPA General Command in close coordination with two (2) JRA members.  The ransom allegedly paid was $3 Million and Wakaoji was released on December, 1986 in Quezon City.  The second incident was the bombing at Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Buendia Ave., Makati City on January 19, 1991.  However, the bomb prematurely exploded killing the terrorist Ahmad Ahmad and the wounding of Abdul Kadhim Saad, both Iraqi nationals.  The third incident was the bombing of PAL Flight 434 bound for Narita, Japan on December 11, 1994 resulting in the death of a Japanese national and injuries to five others.


B.      Terrorist Organizations


1.       Domestic Terrorist Groups


In the Philippines, the groups espousing violence take on two forms: those with ethno-religious connection, such as the extremist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the MILF and those which banner a politico-ideological cause, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF).  Ralph Peters argues on Marxist/Maoist type of warfare, “Wise competitors will not even attempt to defeat us on our terms; rather they will seek to shift the playing field away from military confrontation or turn to terrorism and non-traditional terms of assault.”[5] These groups are apparently enjoying aid and support from foreign terrorist organizations. The international linkage of the CPP, however, has been considerably reduced.  The violent nature of the activities of the ethno-religious groups in Mindanao, such as the ASG who have tendencies towards extremism, have created a disturbing effect on the local government.


Other groups which have also been advocating violence are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  However, the MNLF has already signed a peace agreement with the government, dissipating possible threats of violence from them.  The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement in September 1996, created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. However, the ASG and MILF rejected the agreement signed by former President Fidel V. Ramos and MNLF Chairman Nur  Misuari.  They see it as betrayal of the true ideals and aspiration of Muslim Mindanao and, therefore, vowed to continue the armed struggle.


      The following are the terrorist groups in the Philippines:


a.       Abu Sayyaf


The Abu Sayyaf Group has a strength of 1,148 and assorted firearms of 386 as of 1998.  Their units are concentrated  in Basilan Province, Sulu Province and Zamboanga City.  The leadership of ASG suffered a major setback with the death of their leader Abdurajak Janjalani during the encounter with government forces on 18 December 1998.  The group is engaged in extortion, kidnap-for-ransom, piracy, highway robbery and hold-up to raise funds for the procurement of war materials.  Its ultimate objective is to establish an independent Islamic Theocratic State in Mindanao.  It adheres to an extremist view of Jihad Kital which lead them to commit terrorism and violence to advance its cause.  Most of their targets are places of worship, religious personalities, public places and vital installations.


Figure 2 shows the increasing strength of the Abu Sayyaf group starting with 120 members in 1993 which increased to 1,150 members in 1998.  The big jump was due to massive recruitment by its leaders. Violence perpetrated by ASG has been dramatic.  The group advocates the complete annihilation of all non-Muslims in Mindanao and has carried out numerous atrocities to this end.  The worst attacks occurred in April 1995 when about 200 ASG members raided Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur escaped with 20 hostages who were used as human shield to cover their retreat.[6]


b.       MILF


Strength and Deployment – The MILF headed by Hashim Salamat professes to the goal of establishing an independent Islamic State in Mindanao.  It has strength of 13,459 regulars as of year-end 1998.  The increase of 2,604 from previous year is attributed to the mix-up of MILF and ASG elements and perhaps that of the Muslim Islamic Liberation Organization (MILO) that became united under the Al Sallafiyah.  The group has estimated 10,227 assorted firearms.  It continues to maintain forty five (45) encampments scattered all over the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Saranggani, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Sultan Kudarat.  They have intensified extortion activities to support the said camps.


Financial Support and International Links  A  certain Al   Mokhru Ibrahim, a member of Ikhwan Al Muslimen from Qatar, offered MILF Chairman fifty million pesos (P50M) as initial funding for the construction of a hospital building at Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao.  The Ikhwan Al Muslimen was founded by hardline fundamentalists from Egypt and Sudan.  It is an international Islamic movement currently undertaking Islamic expansion activities worldwide to promote Islamic teaching.  Also, a certain Hussain Mustapha, a Saudi Arabian and close associate of Mohammad Jamaal Khalifa, together with two unidentified Saudi Arabian nationals visited Camp Abubakar to deliver undetermined amount of





money for the installation of an international satellite communication system to enable their leaders to get in touch with their foreign supporters.  The  MILF  has already established their own internet website.


Other financial supporters included three (3) Egyptian nationals who gave undetermined amount of dollars to MILF Vice Chairman for Military Affairs Al Had Murad.  They also promised future financial support to MILF.


Training – Three (3) Muslim foreign nationals from Egypt and Afghanistan are handling the MILF Commando Training. A former Sudanese, Lt. Col. Ahmad Al Gamen taught, bomb/explosives manufacture at Camp Abubakar.  He resigned from the Sudanese Armed Forces in 1995 and joined the group of Osama Bin Ladin.  He was tasked to sow terrorism against Europeans in Pakistan.  Al Gamen,  reportedly a bearded Saudi Arabian dissident, is said to have masterminded the bombings of US embassies at Kenya and Tanzania last August 1998 in which 235 people died.  Bin Laden is reportedly living in Afghanistan but his violent words and ideas incited terrorist acts far away.[7] The MILF has also sent students to Pakistan particularly in Mahad Mandolee, Lahore for military training and Islamic studies.  They have already completed Bangsa Moro Training (BMT) before being sent to Pakistan.


c.       Mainstream CPP/NPA/NDF


The objectives of the mainstream CPP/NPA/NDF are the violent overthrow of the government and to establish of a so-called “People’s Democratic Coalition Government.”  It aims to restructure Philippine society based on the Marxist doctrine of classless society.  The group is engaged in party-building, army-building and united- front building.  The party considers political struggle as a mode of offensive action and use peace negotiation as an instrument of warfare.  The NPA wages guerilla warfare in the countryside and undertakes partisan terroristic operations in selected urban centers.  Then the NDF implements the united-front programs of the CPP through its "cause-oriented and sectoral front organizations.” The objective is to arouse anti-government militancy among the “basic forces” of the labor, peasant, student, youth and urban poor sectors.

In Figure 3, the CPP/NPA/NDF structure is governed by National Congress, Central Committee, Political Bureau and Executive Committee.  It has 17 regional Committees all over the country.


The main source of support of the dissident terrorists is the people in the countryside. The support is given either voluntarily or because of fear.  In 1998, the Party collected an estimated amount of P16 Million from local sources nationwide.  From the Overseas Revolutionary Work (ORW), the party collected P11.9 million in 1998.  Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, the NPA received considerable financial and logistical support from Libya as part of QADDAFI’s program to establish a string of revolutionary movements in the Asia-Pacific region.  Support from Tripoli included provisions of modern weaponry (such as high-powered assault rifles, detonators, explosives RPGs and SAMs) as well as training in strategic urban terrorist tactics.  Libya also established an organization called the “Mathba” to try and promote the image of the NPA (particularly in Australia) as a movement for “liberty and freedom” instead of the armed wing of the CPP.  The NPA also received support in the form of weapons and training from North Korea in return for providing information on the former US Clark Air and Subic Naval Bases, as well as on key American military figures.


2.       International Terrorist Groups


Following are the international terrorist groups which had successfully established in the Philippine territory:


a.       Yousef-Murad Terrorist Cell


The discovery of an intricate and clandestine group of international terrorists in 1991 ushered in a new dimension to the Philippine security situation.  The suspicion on their activities and presence in the country was further bolstered by the arrest of Abdul Hakim Murad on January 7, 1995.  Investigation later revealed that Murad was a member of the “Liberation Army,” an organization committed to fighting the United States and the Israeli governments.



          Significant pieces of information obtained from files encrypted from a recovered laptop computer also revealed Murad’s association with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef as well as their plan to bomb eleven (11) US commercial airlines flying the Manila-Hongkong-Singapore-Los Angeles route.  This plot was to have been the centerpiece of the so-called “Oplan Bojinka” which was revealed later to be an intricate and sophisticated network of international terrorists using the country as a venue of their terrorist activities.  The bombing of a Philippine Airlines jet bound for Japan from Cebu on 11 Dec 1994 was a test-run to the said Oplan which included the bombing of US Airlines, American and Israeli embassies, and training of local Islamic extremist groups.


The Murad arrest became instrumental to the subsequent arrest of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, a Pakistani national who is the alleged mastermind in the bombing of the World Trade Center, in New York City, USA and the acknowledged leader of the “Liberation Army.” Yousef is an Afghan war veteran who had received military training from Afghan rebel groups that maintain bases in Western Pakistan.  Yousef recruited Murad to his extremist group and trained him in the making and use of explosives for terroristic  purposes.


The arrest of Murad in Manila and Yousef in Pakistan also brought to fore the plot of the group to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in 1995.  Subsequently, a sequel to Oplan Bojinka was uncovered which outlined three (3) phases of terroristic activities:


1.       Assassination of top-ranking government officials, foreign ambassadors, diplomats, military/police officials and big-business personalities;


2.       Bombing of various commercial centers, foreign-owned offices/infrastructures/establishments and vital government installations such as power, water and communication; and


3.       Kidnapping-for-ransom and robbery-hold-up activities, targeting among others, prominent personalities, commercial banks and financial institutions.

The revelations made by Murad led to the arrest of another suspected member of the Yousef terrorist cell, identified as Usama Asmorai alias Wali Khan Shah or Hanses Grabi Ibrahim.  Wali Khan, a Pakistani national, is also an Afghan war veteran who admitted having close links with Yousef.  He has gone to Zamboanga to conduct training for the Abu Sayyaf Group.  There was also a report on the conduct of regimented training of suspected  Islamic Fundamentalists of various nationalities at Matabungkay, Lian, Batangas sometime in December, 1994.  The group was reportedly composed of twenty (20) members, five (5) of whom are confirmed Filipino Muslims while the rest are Palestinians, Egyptians and an American.


b.       Japanese Red Army


The JRA cell in the Philippines was organized by Hiroshi Sensui and Norio Sasaki who entered the country in the guise of setting-up business ventures.  Sensui was eventually arrested on June 6, 1998 in Manila and subsequently deported to Japan.


c.       Abu Nidal Organization


The ANO, founded in 1974, opposes all efforts of political reconciliation of Israel and Arab countries.  It is a well-funded and financially stable terrorist organization based in the Middle East.  Its activities were revealed with the arrest of five of its members in December 1987 and one ranking member, Ehmad Yousef, in Metro Manila in 1989.  The arrest led to the discovery of the group’s plans to conduct attacks/bombings at the former US Military facility, Clark Air Force Base, in Angeles City, Pampanga.


C.  Local Links of International Terrorists

A disturbing element of the discovery of an international terrorist cell in the country is the fact that the latter would not have existed without the support from domestic terrorist group.  The Yousef-Wali Khan-Janjalani connection persisted because all three had one common denominator and that they were all Afghan war veterans.  Likewise, they espouse the same political and ideological objective which is the spread of Islam through jihad or holy war.  They follow the same means of advancing their cause – the use of violence and terrorism, and they have a common extremist view of the Islamic faith.


Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani is the founder and leader of the local extremist/terroristic group known as the Al-Harakat-Al-Islamiya or Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) operating in Mindanao.  He was killed during an engagement with PNP elements in 1998 in Basilan province.  The ASG has a predisposition to violence in pursuing its objective of establishing an independent Theocratic Islamic State in Mindanao.  It also provided the support network of the Yousef cell in the country.


Yousef visited Mindanao in the early part of 1994 to meet Abu Sayyaf members and sought their support to establish cells in the National Capital Region, while promising to train ASG hardliners on modern way of improvising explosive devices.  It was during this trip that he also revealed his plan of assassinating the Pope and the role of the ASG to claim responsibility to gain propaganda mileage as this will internationalize their image.


Logistical support for the plot would have also to be provided.  A connection was made through bank transactions of one Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a wealthy Saudi national who is reported to be an Islamic Missionary in the Philippines and a close friend of Janjalani.  Khalifa’s link with international terrorist organizations can be traced through his membership in the Al Afghani, a newly-formed Islamic militant group of Afghan war veterans.  The Al Afghan has close and direct links with international terrorist organizations.


The Abu Sayyaf links with international terrorist organizations are facilitated by some local NGOs and foreign organizations with offices in the country. Currently, there are 310 foreign organizations or entities which are not terrorist organizations per se, but offer a wide range of opportunities for terrorist infiltration.  As can be gleaned, the linkage passes through several levels, namely: local and foreign NGOs, business corporations, personalities and foreign militant groups.  Religious consideration may have been a factor to the Abu Sayyaf Group receiving help and training in Afghanistan.  Filipinos there fought under the aegis of extremist Rasool Sayyaf.[8]  The training is done through funding from various sympathetic organizations.


The ASG also has links with Libyan groups.  This was confirmed when Abdurajak Janjalani traveled to Libya to attend an international conference sometime in the last quarter of 1993 or first quarter of 1994.  During this conference, Janjalani was elected Amir Al Islamiya (Islamic Spiritual/Leader) and the name Al Harakat Al Islamiya (AHAI) was adopted to replace the name Abu Sayyaf.  The influence of Libya on the Abu Sayyaf was likewise highlighted when the Libyan Ambassador acted as intermediary for the release of American missionary, Charles Walton, who was abducted in December, 1994.  One of the demands of Abu Sayyaf was the lifting of US economic sanctions on Libya.


It is likewise significant to note that the Libyan-supported HAMAS has developed links with AHAI.  This was revealed when three (3) suspected foreign terrorists together with a local terrorist were arrested on 21 April 1995 at Davao City.  Firearms, explosive devices and HAMAS publications were found in their possession. Of those arrested, Nedal Saldeh Odeh (aka Abu Turab), a Kuwaiti national, was identified as HAMAS member since the late 80’s and the leader of Al Gamma, a  terrorist cell operating in the Philippines.


D. High – risk Foreign Nationals

Another important factor to consider in international terrorism is the  influx of “high risk foreign nationals”, who entered the Philippines for seemingly legitimate purposes.  However, subsequent arrests of several of them as suspected terrorists raised the concerns over their influx into the country.  Pakistanis topped the list followed by Iranians and then Egyptians.  Notably, the quarterly arrivals of Pakistanis remained at the 800-1,000 level.  Relatedly, unconfirmed reports disclosed that some news reporters at Ninoy Aquino International Airport are involved in human smuggling thereat.[9] The going rate for illegal alien seeking entry into the country through Immigration Departure desk is a staggering  One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00). 


In 1994, thirty (30) foreign nationals suspected to be terrorists were arrested during the joint operations conducted by different law enforcers in Metro Manila, Bulacan and Davao City.  Four (4) others voluntarily surrendered to the authorities but were subsequently released for lack of evidence.  The arrested foreign nationals carried Pakistani, Jordanian, Omani, Syrian, Palestinian. Iraqi, Sudanese or Saudi passports.  Of the total arrested suspects, twenty-six (26) were charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosives but twelve (12) of them were released on bail, seven (7) were released, and one (1) was turned-over to United States authorities for lack of evidence.


III.           Philippine Government Policies on Terrorism

            All current counter-terrorist measures are based mainly on Presidential pronouncements and  Executive Orders.  Foremost among these are the following:


a.       The Philippine government has declared a total war against terrorism.

b.       The government will not abdicate its duty to protect the nation, most especially non-combatants who are usually the victims of terrorism.

c.       All terrorist actions are considered as criminal acts and the government will undertake all lawful measures to prevent them and bring to justice those who commit terroristic activities.

d.       The Philippine government subscribes to all international conventions and initiatives against terrorism.

e. The government will exhaust all legal means and secure a peaceful resolution of the conflict to minimize if not prevent the loss of lives and destructions to properties.

f.         The government must forge a strong partnership with the people.

g.       There will be no sanctuary or “safehaven” for terrorist.


IV.            Conceptual framework for counter-terrorism

            Based on the aforestated, these national policies ensure the protection of Philippine interests and resources. The general framework for the national strategy takes into consideration the threat to the environment, political realities, moral and legal traditions, and the human and physical resources available.  It likewise recognizes the primacy of the PNP in dealing with any criminal act, including those undertaken for the purpose of terrorism.  Furthermore, in addressing any terrorist-related incident, the crisis management organizations as well as all police and military units are expected to be generally guided and implement the stated national policies.


            The national strategy is composed of two components: proactive and responsive.  The proactive component of the strategy is composed of anti-terrorism measures which are intended to prevent or reduce the probability of terrorist attacks and maintain a secure environment for the national populace.  On the other hand, the responsive component of the strategy is focused on actual counter-actions responding to an ongoing terrorist incident.


            The government employed some strategies to suppress the activities of terrorist groups. These are the following:


A.            Preventive  efforts


The Proactive component focuses on the cooperation and linkages among law enforcement agencies in preventing the activities of the terrorists.


The following are some of the preventive efforts of the government in countering terrorism:


1.       Establishment of international linkages and cooperation.

2.       Improvement of intelligence capabilities.

3.       Strengthening of preventive and security measures for effective Border Control and Aviation and Maritime Security.

4.       Enhancement of mechanisms for effective immigration control and protection of the integrity of travel documents.

5.       Development of PNP/AFP counter-terrorist capabilities.

6.       Development of doctrines for countering terrorism.

7.       Improvement of the legal framework.

8.       Close coordination and cooperation with other government agencies.

9.       Strengthening of security measures for transportation, communication and other vital installations.


B.            Responsive Capabilities


Since preventive measures alone do not guarantee immunity from terrorism, it must be backed up by a comprehensive response capability to deal quickly and effectively with any terrorist act.  Having an effective response capability also serves as a deterrent, which in turn contributes to prevention, such as following:


1.               The Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) will normally take cognizance of terrorist-related crisis situations except those with national or international impact, in which case the NACAHT board will take cognizance.

2.               Crisis situations involving foreign nationals or facilities.

3.               Involvement of Filipinos in terrorist incidents.

4.               Handling of crisis at the lowest levels possible.

5.               Graduated armed response.

6.               Non-compromise with terrorists.

7.               Respect for human rights.

8.               Handling of hostage situations.

9.               Media management and public information.


V.               Difficulties in Counter-Terrorism Operations

The results of the government’s counter-terrorism campaign should have had

far more deterrent effects had it not been for certain problems and constraints encountered by law enforcement agencies, particularly those dealing with suspected foreign terrorist groups operating in the country.


            There is no law that specifically addresses terrorism.  It must be pointed out that terrorism is not like any ordinary crime in which the elements of the offense could be found in the Revised Penal Code.  The existing laws that we have make it difficult for our law enforcement agencies to file a strong case against foreign nationals suspected of involvement in acts constituting terrorism.


            Many of the arrested suspected foreign terrorists have been released, not necessarily because they are innocent but more often than not because law enforcement agencies cannot file the appropriate criminal charges against them.


            A typical example was the case of Abdul Hakim Murad, who was arrested on 7 January 1995 but was later on turned over to the US authorities as we do not have the laws that could prosecute and convict him for his acts of terrorism.  More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that we do not have the laws to prosecute and convict those performing crucial functions as part of the support network/system of the terrorist groups.


            It should be noted that most of the countries in the world, in their efforts to suppress terrorism, have enacted internal security acts or anti-subversive laws.  Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore which were historically confronted with internal security problems have successfully contained them through these acts/laws.

VI.            Philippine Center on Transnational Crime

The signing of Executive Order No. 62 on January 15, 1999 by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is a big step in the fight against international and domestic terrorism in the Philippines.  The Executive Order created the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) which calls for the formulation and implementation of a concerned program of action of all law enforcement, intelligence and other government agencies for the prevention and control of transnational crime including terrorism.  The PCTC would serve as the nucleus and linkage of all the law enforcement agencies involved in the anti-terrorist operations.  Then, a central database would be established at the Center through modern information and telecommunications technology to provide information to concerned agencies on the terrorist groups, methodologies, areas of operation and prior arrest and convictions.  This is necessary considering that the most of the local law enforcement agencies are concentrating their operations on the domestic terrorist groups while the activities of international terrorist groups are not monitored.


The Philippine Center on Transnational Crime would also serve as the core group of the soon to be organized ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime here in Manila.  This was the commitment of President Estrada during the 6th ASEAN Summit on December 15, 1998 at Hanoi, Vietnam upon realizing the growing threat of transnational crime.  The rapid globalization and the unrestricted movement of people, commodities, information and ideas have provided a conducive environment for transnational crime.  There is a need, therefore, for countries to close ranks and put-up unified effort to fight this new phenomenon and increasing threat to World Peace.


VII.        Assessment

The terrorist threat is real.  It has been established that international terrorists

are in the country, that they have local counterparts, and  that there exists a complex network to support their activities.  It is a threat we have to face and prepare for.


            Paul John, a British journalist and former editor of the New Statesman in his article, The Seven (7) Deadly Sins of Terrorism, illustrates just how serious the threat of terrorism is today:


“A free society that reacts to terrorism by invoking authoritarian methods necessarily damages itself.  But an even greater danger – and much more common today – is that free societies, in their anxiety to avoid authoritarian excesses, fail to arm themselves against the terrorist threat, and so abdicate their responsibility to uphold the law.  The terrorists succeed when they provoke oppression, and they triumph when they are met with appeasement.  The seventh and deadliest sin of terrorism is that it saps the will of a civilized society to defend itself.”


            Transnational organized crime and terrorism can no longer be written off as “boutique” law-enforcement problem.  This issue has become central to security and international foreign policy concern in the post-cold war era, extending far beyond the scope of conventional law enforcement.[10]  The difficulty is that many law enforcement agencies focus on the domestic peace and order problem but are

slow  to recognize the increasingly transnational nature of crime.


            The sporadic foreign terroristic activities in the Philippines and the link of local terrorist with foreign counterparts show that the country is a potential area of operations by active terrorist groups.  Probable targets like foreign embassies, foreign airlines or prominent persons are vulnerable to attacks.  Foreign support to local terrorists and certain weaknesses of government’s capabilities are areas of concern.  There must also be international agreements for a common dedication to develop national law-enforcement systems capable of fulfilling international obligations.”[11]



[1]     Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995, (Philippine Senate)


[2]     Draft UN Protocol Against the Illicit Related Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials Supplementary to the UN Draft Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, (Vienna International Center, Vienna, Austria)


[3]     Parameters, Summer 1997


[4]     Strategic Assessment 1997, (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, USA)


[5]     Patterns of Global Terrorism, (US Department of State, April 1996)


[6]     Chalk, The Davao Consensus, pp 89-90;  Sinha, Muslim Insurgency in the Philippines, p 635;  Turner, Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines, p 8, Philippine Massacre is a Sign of Worse to Come, (The Guardian, 07/04/95);  and Muslim Rebels Kill Scores in Philippine City, (New York Times)


[7]     US Commandos Set to Seize Bin Laden, The Philippine Star, April 14, 1999, p.2


[8]     Tara Kartha, Proliferation and Smuggling of Light Weapons Within the Region, (IOSA)


[9]     NAIA Newsmen Linked to Lucrative Racket, (The Philippine Post, dated March 15, 1999)


[10]    John McFarlane, Transnational Crime as Security Issue, (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Working Group on Transnational Crime, 23-24 May 1998)


[11]    Australian Federal Police, International Initiatives to Combat Transnational Criminality, (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-pacific Working Group on Transnational Crime, 23-23 May 1998)






Figure 1.   Links of Transnational Crime


Figure 2.   Abu Sayyaf Group Strength  1993 – 1998


Figure 3.   CPP/NPA/NDF Organizational Structure